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I. Introduction 
'Financial system and monetary policy' is a vast and intricate terrain. Normally, a 
discussion on the subject is expected to delimitate the financial field, clarify the main 
policy issues. indicate the various instruments available for use, outline the institutional 
arrangements. and investigate the linkages of the system with other variables of the 
economy.(1) Clearly, one could not reasonably hope Mohsin S. Khan and Abbas 
Mirakhor to attempt such a wide coverage within the time and space confines of an 
article. However, even in the sub-area of Islamic banking the authors use concepts and 
employ methods which could only lead them to conclusions of suspect validity. The 
paper of Khan and Mirakhor is spread over three main sections in addition to the one at 
the end which contains some broad conclusions of the analysis. In the first two sections, 
the authors state some of the main features and implications of an interest free banking 
system. The material they present here is largely a summary(2) of what is already 
available on the subject in the literature and need not detain us here. 
 
The main argument of Khan and Mirakhor is contained in the third section of their 
work. Here the authors attempt to present a theoretical model in the standard IS-LM 
tradition. The effects of monetary policy(3) on the macro variables of an Islamic 
economy are explained with the help of the model and the authors arrive at the 
following conclusions: 
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i. Whether the monetary authority manipulates the money supply or the 
mudarabah flow of financing as an intermediate policy objective, the impact on the 
level of national income is the same in each case (p.53). 
 
ii. An expansionary monetary policy would reduce the financial rates of return and 
increase output in the short run (p.54). 
 
The authors explicitly hold that there is virtually no difference in the way the 
monetary policy would affect economic variables whether the banking system operates 
through predetermined interest rates or works through the profit sharing ratios (p. 53). 
 
We may touch upon the appropriateness of these claims later. Presently we shall 
demonstrate that the source of these claims is a model which suffers from formulative 
blemishes and structural infirmities. 
 
2. Equality of Rates - Proposition 
Following the tradition, Khan and Mirakhor have structured their model on a two-
tier mudarabah arrangement.(4) First, there is a contract between the banks and the 
public which ultimately gives the latter a rate of return (r b) on their investment deposits 
(Db). Second, there is a contract between the banks and the entrepreneurs who borrow 
from the banks. Here the banks eventually get a rate of return (r) on the loans (Fb) they 
provide to the entrepreneurs. 
 
True, the rate of return (r) the banks receive on loans must in some way be related, 
as Khan and Mirakhor hold, to the rate (rb) the banks pay on their liabilities. But here 
the authors have unwittingly run into some confusion. They assume that the bankers' 
operating and other costs are zero, and believe that the assumption would make the two 
rates identical (p.48, also, No. 31). Their exercise largely hinges on this equality of rates 
presumption. They fail to see that such equality is just not possible under a two-tier 
mudarabah arrangement. We shall show that the inequality r b < r must invariably hold 
despite a zero cost assumption. 
 
Unlike Khan and Mirakhor, let us start with a statement for the determination of r. 
For rb is a direct function of r, other things remaining the same. 
 
In mudarabah the banks assign their resources consisting mostly of investment 
deposits, to the productive sector by advancing loans to the entrepreneurs In exchange. 
the banks get from them an agreed proportion ( g ) of profits ( p ) allocable from the 
total business profit (P) to their contribution (Fb) to the aggregate capital (K) employed 
in the firm Thus we have: 
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On the other hand, the banks will always share with the borrowers their losses (
·
P ) in 
the Fb/K proportion Khan and Mirakhor innocuously put p > < 0 implying that the 
negative rate of return (r') on (Fb) is also determined by the same formula that 
determines the positive (r). Obviously this is not the case. It can easily be shown that 
while (r) is always less than the overall profit rate (P/K) the rate of loss r' on F b equals 
the overall rate (P/K) under mudarabah arrangements.(5) Thus unlike the position in 
secular economics, here profit is not in a sense an equal counterpart of loss. We cannot 
use the same formula to determine the two as the learned authors seem to maintain in 
line with the secular tradition. 
 
Again, suppose that the depositors are entitled to l fraction of the profits earned 
by the banks through the investment of their deposits (Db) as stated above. Let us also 
retain the assumptions that the operating and other costs of the banks are zero, that all 
the investment deposits are fully loaned out i.e. Db=Fb, and that the banks have no other 
funds to finance their lending operations. The transactions with the central bank are 
ignored. Given these postulates, the volume of profit banks will share with the 
depositors will be the same as they received from the entrepreneurs i.e. g p. This would 
give us the rate of return banks would pay to the depositors: 
,0,10,
D
r
b
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=  
The fraction of losses, if any, the depositors have to bear would be Db/D0 + KD) where 
K0 represents the net assets of the banks at the beginning of the period. 
 
Since Db=Fb, the two rates (rb) and (r) may be compared in terms of their numerators 
only. Obviously, 
10   as   <l<gp<lgp  
and therefore: 
rrb <  
If we relax our assumptions to allow for the operating and other costs and include banks' 
own resources in addition to (Db) in the funds banks in fact use for lending, things may 
become somewhat complicated, but the gap between r b and r would only tend to 
widen.(6) 
 
Khan and Mirakhor have treated the bank as a 'no loss on the way' transmission 
line between the depositors on the one hand, and the entrepreneurs on the other; the 
former supplying the funds just like the equity holders to the firms. This led them to the 
belief that rb=r, and in turn prompted them to erecting their model the way they did. (7) 
But the misconception the exercise is based on, makes the conclusions deduced there 
from dubious. 
 
Of course, one may allow for the gap between rb, and r in the model. But that 
would need a revision of the whole exercise. One more variable r has to be added to the 
system requiring some additional equations for its completion. (8) The given set of 
relationships, even if suitably modified to accommodate the gap. is inadequate and the 
model must face the problem of indeterminacy. 
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Furthermore. no less serious is the fact that even if one grants, as a heroic 
assumption, the equality of the rates i.e. r b,=r, one may not find it possible to defend the 
model in its present form. This brings us to the following section. 
 
3. Structural Problems 
Khan and Mirakhor follow the comparative static equilibrium technique for 
purposes of analysis. They specify the relevant sectors of the economy, present a flow 
of funds accounts table, and spell out some behavioural relationships. Using these 
building blocks, they design a model which essentially is an extension, with some 
modifications, of a simple macro economic secular frame. This frame rests on two 
markets. First, there is a commodity (including services) market where in equilibrium, 
the savings (S) and investment (I) must equate. Investment is assumed to be an 
exogenous factor and savings are taken as a function of aggregate income (Y) and the 
rate of interest ( r ). 
Second is the money market, where the equilibrium condition is that the 
exogenously given money supply (M) is equal to the demand for money. The demand 
for money is a function f (٠) of money income, (P ٠ Y where P is the price level) and 
( r ) the rate of interest. To simplify matters further, it is assumed that P º 1. 
Thus, we have a system of two equations: 
0I)r,Y( S    )I;r,Y( f 1 =-º       (i) 
0M)r,Y(     )M;r,Y( f 2 =-fº        (ii) 
where (Y) and ( r ) are the endogenous variables and I and M are exogenous as indicated 
above. Khan and Mirakhor replace the rate of interest by the rate of return on 
investment (rb=r). They add two more markets, one in the reserves (Rb) of the banks 
and the other in their equity shares. They eliminate the latter while solving the model 
using the Walrasian law (p.51). 
 
We may observe that one can get the same results as the authors ultimately obtain 
(pp.52-53) from merely the first four equations of the model given the equilibrium 
conditions they specify in (9), (10) and (11), and the equality between DM and DDp 
(p.52).(9) The remaining part of their structure is therefore, redundant. However, let us 
meet Khan and Mirakhor on their on ground. 
 
The sort of comparative static model conceived by Khan and Mirakhor is better 
solved by using the total derivative tool. (10) The authors have however, chosen to 
employ linear first order difference equations. There is hardly any objection to that, but 
the difficulty is that their formulations suffer from some serious inaccuracies. 
Suppose we have a simple two variables system: 
22110 XaXaYa +=      (iii) 
where, Y, X1 and X2 are some variables and a0, a1 and a2 are respectively their 
parameters. If X1 changes by DX1 and X2 by DX2 during a given period, then it is easy 
to find that DY, the change in Y over the period, is given as: 
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0
2211
a
XaXaY D+D=D     (iv) 
And if Y' were the beginning period value and Y" the end period value of the variable, 
we have: 
 
0
2211
a
XaXaYY D+D+¢=¢¢     (v) 
 
Thus, if one wishes to operate a system in terms of difference equations, as Khan and 
Mirakhor do, all variables in a relationship must assume the form of differences as in 
(iv) above. Evidently, the authors have missed the point. Their system gives 
incongruous results if one verifies the equations by assigning appropriate numerical 
values to the variables and parameters of the model. (11) The equations, with 
modifications where needed, are given hereunder. We have used the same number for 
each equation as in their paper to facilitate comparisons. 
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One can readily notice that the last three equations are exactly of the same form as 
equation (v) given earlier. Also, the revised versions of equations (20), (21) and (22) in 
the paper may be obtained by replacing DM by DFb in (16), (17) and (18) above. It may 
be mentioned that in the flow of funds accounts table (p.49) as also in note 28 (p. 56) 
I and S must be replaced by DI and DS to attain compatibility. Our numerical exercise 
gives consistent results for the revised system.(12) 
A constraint of the model clearly is: 
 
121 WfbrfM -D-¢<D  
This follows from equation (16) if r"b > o as we have maintained in Section 2. Again, if 
DM = DW-1 as assumed in our numerical illustration, the constraint would become: 
 
2
1
f1
brfM
-
¢
<D  
 
4. The Inferences 
Clearly one cannot accept at face value the inferences drawn in Khan and 
Mirakhor based as they are on an untenable equality of rates (rb=r) proposition. Of 
greater consequence is, however, their replacing of the rate of interest in the secular 
model by a rate of profit for its Islamization. Indeed, not a few Islamic economists have 
been attracted to adopt this course either directly or via the sharing of profit ratio, 
presumably because it makes things (look) so easy. The demand and supply apparatus 
remains intact in the money market and its linkage with the commodity (and services) 
market is not disturbed. Simplicity is a virtue, but must be avoided if it tends to become 
misleading. 
 
In secular economics interest is essentially viewed as a price for parting with 
liquidity. In contrast, profit is thought of as a reward linked with investment. Unlike the 
rate of interest, the rate of profit may be negative. The outside limit for the liquidity trap 
is the zero rate of interest. What this limit will be in the case of a profit rate? "The 
importance of the liquidity trap stems from its presenting a circumstance under which 
monetary policy has no effect on the interest rate and thus, on the level of real income" 
(Dornbusch and Fischer 1987, p.146). Can we erect a parallel proposition for the rate of 
profit? Is it possible to visualize a situation in which a profit rate could, for such a 
reason, fail to have any effect on the level of real income? How will the replacement 
influence the position and shift of the LM curve? Such questions require a more careful 
investigation than has so far been carried out. 
We may specify an investment spending function as: 
0b        ,biII >-=  
where i is the rate of interest and b measures the interest response of investment, I 
denoting the autonomous investment expenditure. In this relationship rate of interest has 
presumably a little direct influence on the aggregate investment spending decisions. The 
equation states that the lower rate of interest, the higher is planned in vestment. The 
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negative relationship signifies that a reduction in the rate of interest increases the 
profitability of additions to the capital stock, and therefore, leads to a larger rate of 
planned investment. Profitability in this case tends to increase via the enhanced leverage 
effect (Hasan 1985, pp. 23-24). 
 
The following figure may help clarify the argument further. 
 
Rate of interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, Khan and Mirakhor imply to replace in the above diagram the interest rate (i) by the 
rate of return (r) the banks earn on the loans they give to the firms. But r is, unlike i, an 
uncertain return, varying directly with the risk estimates. What has the monetary 
expansion to do with it, unless risk can be shown to vary inversely with such expansion? 
 
Even if one momentarily grants that increase in liquidity would somehow tend to 
lower r, one cannot presumably be as confident about the extent of the fall as in the case 
of interest rate. Again, for the firms, interest rate is a given cost parameter, which helps 
in evaluating the effect of varying degrees of leverage on the return of equity, i.e.ro. 
This role can rarely be performed by an uncertain r. The linkage between r and r 0 q is 
not straight, perhaps here we have a case of mutual causation. To overcome the 
difficulty, Khan and Mirakhor make a crucial assumption that expectations of all the 
economic agents are realized (p.50). For their model, this may be a necessary but is not 
a sufficient condition. One must further assume that the expectations of the banks and 
the entrepreneurs concerning the overall profit rate (P/K) on total investment are 
identical (Hasan 1985, p.17). Without this, the model may defy solution. For, here r 0 q 
and r are both ex ante concepts locked in a circular relationship (Hasan, No. 3). 
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5. Conclusions 
Khan and Mirakhor have imposed on their model a structure and constraints which 
lend a tautological character to their exercise. (13) The indiscreet replacement of the rate 
of interest in the secular model by a profit rate makes their conclusions tentative and 
questionable. Formulation infirmities have further weakened their position. Still, their 
work is laudable for it opens up some new areas of investigation in Islamic banking. 
 
Notes 
1. For a detailed discussion of these requirements see K.E. Boulding. 1963. pp. 209-213. 
2. Indeed, it is a faithful summary avoiding comments or modifications and hardly missing or 
adding anything of significance. 
3. Some find the nomenclature confusing, "for it is the fiscal policy that is primarily concerned, in 
its quantitative aspects, with the money stock, whereas the so-called monetary policy is mainly 
concerned with the regulation of certain financial instruments, such as bank loans which are 
not usually regarded as money" (Boulding 1963, p. 211). It is all the more necessary to clarify 
the term when Islamic norms are also brought in. 
4. One of the first candid explanations is found in M.N. Siddiqi (l978). 
5. Since K/PF/h,K/F.Ph bb g=g=  or rˆg  where .K/Prˆ =  Given o < Y <1 we must have the 
profit rate available to the banks on loans r < P/K the overall rate of return in business. 
      In the case of loss ( P ) we have the banks' share of loss .K/F.P b =p  It gives 
,K/PF/h b = or K/Pr =¢  i.e. the same as in business on the whole. In fact the authors do 
note the asymmetry in the determination of r and r' (p. 44) but they ignore its implications. 
6. The gap between the earned and distributable profits of the banks would increase because the 
latter will be calculated, to quote the authors, "by setting off administrative expenses, 
provision for taxes and reserves, and payments due to the central and other banks in respect of 
the financing provided by them, from total profits" (p.42). 
7. Khan and Mirakhor vividly maintain the distinction between equity and investment deposits in 
the Islamic banking, emphasizing even some of the crucial differences between the two (p.43). 
Even so, they are swayed by the similarities of the variable returns and non-guarantee of the 
nominal value in both cases, and set up rb=r for their model. This allows them to merge the 
savings of banks and depositors into S for the economy in equation (1) of their model and fix 
them both. 
8. For example, two crucial modifications are 
 (l-S) = 
1321b0 WaYararaa -+---  (equation 1, p.50) 
 
132111b0p W)af(r)af(YraraD -D-+D--D+D=D  (equation 5, p.51). 
9. From our different equations, (or the original ones) multiply (1) by f1, (2) by a1 and take their 
difference to find ΔY. Likewise, multiply (1) by sl and (3) by f1 add to get Δrc. Last, add (1) 
and (2) and solve by substituting the value of ΔY (already obtained) to get Δrb. Notice that in 
the structure de signed by Khan and Mirakhor, we must eventually have, in passing from one 
state of equilibrium to another: 
MDDFF pbpb D=D=D=D=D  
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 Combining equations (4), (9) and (11) of the model (see appendix) one can easily show: 
bFM D=D  
 This must, of necessity lead to identical results whether the Central Bank manipulates M or F b. 
It follows, as the authors put it themselves, from the balance sheet equation of the financial 
system in a closed economy (p.53). 
 
10. As an illustration, one may see the solution of the above type, two equations system in 
Mukharji and Pandit, 1982. pp. 213-217. 
 
11. We may take the following arbitrary values at the beginning of the period, the system being in 
equilibrium. 
 Y = 8000  W-1 = 2500  f1 = 1250 
 Dp = Db = M = 1000 rb = r = 0.20  f2 = 0.5 
 Fp = Fb = 1000  rc = 0.25   s1 = 10,000 
 Eb = Ec = 200  a1 = 2000   s2 = 4000 
 Rb = Rc = 100  a2 = 0.15   k = 0.10 
 I = S = 850  a3 = 0.64 
 
12. The verifications are done by assuming that: 
 I = - a1 rb + B1 W-1  (B1 = 0.5) 
 S = a2 Y - B1 W-1  (B2 = 0.14) 
 s3 = B1 + B2 and  and ΔW-1 = ΔM 
 
      Now assuming that the monetary authority increases the money supply by 100 i.e. ΔM = 100 
we find in equilibrium: 
 Δrb = -04,   Δrc = -0.125,   Δ = 960,   ΔI =ΔS = 130 
 ΔRc = 10 
 
 In the new equilibrium the values of the variables become: 
 Y = 8960  W-1 = 2600 
 Dp = Db = M = 1100 rb = r = 0.16 
 Fp =Fb = 1100  rc = 0.125 
 Eb = Ec = 300 
 Rb = Rc = 110 
 I = S = 980 
 
13. The last para in Khan and Mirakhor emphasizes the limitations of the model arising out of 
their stringent assumption. 
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